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Abstract
An economy has a robustly efficient marginal cost pricing equilibrium (mcpe) if it has an mcpe that is Pareto
efficient and if this property is preserved under small variations in preferences endowments and technologies.
We consider economies in which there is a finite number of equilibria, each of which varies continuously with
preferences and endowments. We prove that there exist no robustly efficient marginal cost pricing equilibria.
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1. Introduction.
This paper is about the existence of Pareto efficient marginal cost pricing equilibria in non-
convex economies with smooth preferences and a finite number of equilibria. We prove that such
economies which have Pareto efficient marginal cost pricing equilibria (mcpe) are not robust, i.e., do
not survive small variations in the data of the economy such as preferences, endowments and
technologies. In other words, the property of having a Pareto efficient mcpe is satisfied on a nowhere
dense set.
It was pointed out in Guesnerie (1975) and Brown-Heal (1979) that economies with non-
convex technologies have welfare properties very different from those with convex technologies. The
most widely noticed difference is the difficulty in obtaining Pareto efficient equilibria. The first
welfare theorem is true in any economy, convex or not, so that a competitive equilibrium of a non-
convex economy is Pareto efficient but in general competitive equilibria fail to exist. We study instead
the existence of marginal cost pricing equilibria because they satisfy the necessary (first order)
conditions for Pareto efficiency. But a mcpe may not be Pareto efficient. Indeed, all the mcpe of a
non-convex economy may be Pareto inefficient. This point was noted by Guesnerie (1975) and
developed by Brown and Heal (1979). Beato and Mas-Colell (1985) then observed that in fact one
can have a non-convex economy where all of the mcpe are not only Pareto inefficient but also
productively inefficient. Recently Chichilnisky (1990) showed that it is possible to construct
technologies for which all of the mcpe are inefficient for a generic set of preference profiles. So the
problem of obtaining efficient equilibria in non-convex economies goes deep (for a review, see Vohra
(1990)).
We introduce the concept of "robustly efficient" marginal cost pricing equilibria: an economy
has a robustly efficient mcpe if it has a Pareto efficient mcpe and if there exists a neighborhood of that
economy in which every economy has a Pareto efficient mcpe. This formalizes the idea that we are
interested in Pareto efficient equilibria whose efficiency properties are in some sense robust or stable
under small perturbations in the specification of the economy. We cannot measure the data that
specify an economy exactly, so we are not interested in properties that are not robust to small errors in
the description of the economy. We prove in Theorem 2 that there are no robustly efficient mcpe in
the class of non-convex economies having a finite number of equilibria which vary continuously with
preferences and endowments. Having a Pareto efficient mcpe is not a stable property in a non-convex
economy.
A natural and related question is: Are there necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of at least one Pareto efficient mcpe in a non-convex economy? One can approach this question in
three ways. One is to seek conditions on preferences that ensure the existence of a Pareto efficient
mcpe. A second is to seek such conditions on production sets. A third is to look for such conditions
on the relationships between the production sets and preferences. In general the efficiency of
equilibria depends on this latter relationship. However there is no convenient framework for stating
conditions on the relationships between preferences and technologies, and conditions of this sort may
be hard to verify. Conditions stated on preferences (or production sets) alone have the merit of being
verifiable by inspection of preferences (or production sets) alone, as is true of convexity. A condition
that is verifiable by inspecting each element of the economy separately is easier to check that one that
has to be verified on all elements simultaneously.
We present below in Theorem 1 a condition on preferences that is necessary and sufficient for
the existence of at least one Pareto efficient mcpe whatever the technology of the economy. This
condition is that the aggregate demand of the economy be independent of the distribution of
endowments in the economy. This result is of independent interest in its own right: it is also a crucial
building block in the proof of our main proposition, the non-existence of robustly efficient mcpe
(Theorem 2).
We state in Corollary 1 a condition sufficient to ensure that all mcpe are Pareto efficient, so that
in the sense of the welfare properties of its equilibria, the non-convex economy behaves like a convex
economy.
Finally, we establish in Corollary 2 a connection between the efficiency of the mcpe of a non-
convex economy with production, and the uniqueness of the competitive equilibria of an underlying
exchange economy. Uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium of the underlying exchange economy
is necessary for the efficiency of at least one mcpe.
2. The Model.
The commodity space is Rn. We consider an economy with a single increasing returns firm
whose production possibility set is Y{ and K convex firms whose production possibility sets are Y-.
Firms are indexed by j which runs over the set {1,2,... .AT,/}. A typical production plan of firm j is
y^Yj- We assume:
(Al) For all j , Yj is closed, contains 0 and Yj-R*c^Yj. For all j&I, Yi is convex. Y{ is
not assumed to be convex.
(A2) LetY = £ .wF,, Y = Yt + Y.ThenY is closed and A(-Y) n A(Y) = {0} where A(Y)
denotes the asymptotic cone ofY.
There are m consumers indexed by / . Each has preferences >-,-, endowments (Oi and shares in
the firms of 0i} where 0Lj > 0 and ]ST. 0i} = 1. Let ^ . COi = CO, the total endowment of goods and
services, i's consumption set is X-. A typical consumption plan for consumer / is Jt,eX{.. Let
X = ^d.Xi be the aggregate consumption set. We assume:
(A3) Xi is the positive cone for all consumers.
(A4) Preferences are convex, smooth, regular and monotone. Formally, >-tcan be represented
by a quasi concave utility function U-t which is twice continuously differentiable (C ) and has
bounded derivatives on R+ the positive cone ofRn. The first derivative ofUi never vanishes on /?+
and is positive. The gradient DU^x) of Ui is normalized so that its norm is equal to one.
As in Chichilnisky (1990) the space of preferences denoted P is given the topology induced by
the C1 sup norm on utilities. The C1 sup norm of U is denoted Hi/Jj and defined by
A price vector will be denoted p and is assumed to be in the unit simplex A in Rn.
Let X = ^.Xit the sum of the individual consumption sets. Let A = X Pi (Y + fi>), where
Y = ^ Yi is the sum of the economy's production sets and CO = T^ vvt. is the sum of the individual
endowments. A is the set of aggregate attainable states of the economy. This is assumed to be
representable in polar coordinates by a function Cl{d) where 6 6 R+ is an angular direction and
a( 6) is the distance from the origin at which the boundary of A intersects a ray in the direction 6.
Under our assumptions a(6) is a continuous but not necessarily smooth function. Let
v=(U\9...yUm) be a profile of preferences. An economy E is represented by
| a(6), t>,{wj-}.=1 | The space of all possible economies is topologized by the C1 sup norm
product topology on preference profiles and the C topology on functions a{ 6). This latter choice is
natural as the function a( 0) need not be smooth.
We shall often work with the exchange economy created by removing the production
possibilities of a productive economy, and call this the underlying exchange economy. In this context
we shall need the following definitions. For an exchange economy, let (xv...xm) be a Pareto
efficient allocation and p the supporting price (unique by the smoothness assumption (A4)). Let
y/lxv...xm) be the set of all initial endowments from which individuals facing prices p will choose to
consume (Jc1,...Jcmj, i.e., the set of endowments for which (jcl,...jcwj and p form a competitive
equilibrium. Call this the preimage of the efficient allocation I jq,... Jcmj. Formally,
(Dl)
 ¥(xl,...xn) = {(wl,...wm)eX~*: ^ArgMaO/Jix^xX
Next we define 0 f JCj,...JcmJ: this is the same concept subject to the additional restriction that the
initial endowments should sum to w, the aggregate endowment of the initial exchange economy. That
is, <fr\xv...xrA is the set initial endowments from which individuals facing prices p will consume
(xv...xm) and that also sum to CO. Formally,
(D2) <p(xli...xm) = \(wl,...wm)eX~n: Lw,. = w andVUArgMgxUfa^xX
We shall use maps 8 which assigns to each aggregate endowment vector a list of individual
consumption vectors which sum to that aggregate endowment They represent rules for distributing a
given total of goods and services between individuals. Formally,
We next introduce the concept of a robustly efficient mcpe. Intuitively, this is an Pareto efficient
mcpe in a non-convex economy E such that small variations in the parameters (preferences,
endowments and productions sets) defining the economy lead to another economy E also having a
Pareto efficient mcpe.
(D3) An economy E has a robustly efficient mcpe if it has a Pareto efficient mcpe and if there
exists a neighborhood N(E) of E within which every economy also has a Pareto efficient mcpe.
3. Community Preferences.
The concept of community preference has lengthy history, dating back to Scitovsky (1941),
Stolper (1950), Gorman (1953), Samuelson (1956) and Chipman (1974). The reader is referred to
Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) or to those sources for the original motivation.
For each x e P, let N^x) be the vector normal to the indifference surface of i's preference >-•
at JC, i.e., iV.(Jc) is the gradient of >-,- at X. N^x) is normalized so that |iV.(JC)|=l. Let
G^x) = {xr.Ufa) > U.(x)}. Now define
(D4) G(x) = {y:y e I.-Gfo), Xi** = * and 3N: Vi.tyfo) = N}
G(x) is the set of points preferred to x according to the community preference. It is obtained by
summing a set of individual preferred-or-indifferent sets Gfc) for points x-t that sum to x at which
all consumers have the same marginal rates of substitution between commodities, given by the normal
vectors N£x).
For each point x there are many different consumption allocations xi that sum to x and at which
all consumers have equal marginal rates of substitution. In general the various consumption
allocations with a common marginal rate of substitution that sum to x will have different common
marginal rates of substitution. They will therefore give rise to different sets G(x). So corresponding
to each x there may be G\x), G\x), G3(*),. . . . constructed as above with
G\x)&G\x)&G\x)... In Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) we give necessary and sufficient
conditions for G\x) = G2(x) = G\x)....y i.e., for all sets G{x) constructed as above to be identical.
Under these conditions, one and only one set G(x) is assigned to each point x, and these sets define
the preferred-or-indifferent sets of a complete transitive preference constructed from the profile
{>-1>-2>-3. >-m} of individual preferences. This preference is the social preference or community
preference. If the conditions in Chichilnisky-Heal (1983) are not satisfied, the operation defined in
(D4) can of course be carried out for every x, but it will in general lead us to assign several distinct
sets G(x) to this point, depending on the choice of the xi that sum to x. In this latter case the
boundary of each such set defines a different indifference curve through x, so that the community
preference so constructed is not transitive. The following definition introduces a condition that is
necessary and sufficient for the definition (Dl) to lead to a unique set G(x) for each x, and so to a
transitive social or community preference:
(D5) A family of preferences represented by a set of C1 utility functions {l/1,t/2,....C/III} is said
to be affinely homothetic (AH) if there exists a C2 linear homogeneous utility function UQ and a set
of constant vectors Z, e RH such that for all xeXit
Ui(x) = U0(x + Zl) i = l ,2, m.
(D5) requires that all preferences be translates of one homothetic preference. It does not require
that they be either homothetic or identical. The tangency path of a preference >-• is the set of points
where its indifference surfaces have a given support, i.e., it is a set of the form [x e R^.N^x) = N *}.
Note that this is not the same as an expansion path: because of non-negativity constraints an
expansion path may contain boundary segments, which can never be true of a tengency path.
Chichilnisky and Heal (1983, pages 43-5) elaborate on this point in the context of the difference
between conditions for aggregation of preferences and of demands. We can now state
Theorem (Chichilnisky and Heal (1983)). If preferences are such that their tangency paths
have a single point of intersection1, a necessary & sufficient condition for (Dl) to lead to a unique
set G(x) for each x, and so to a complete and transitive social or community preference, is that
individual preferences { ^ ^ ^ >%,}-care affinely homothetic.
4. Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria.
(D6) The Clarke tangent cone (hereafter tangent cone) to Y d R* at the point ysY, denoted
Tc(Y,y), is the set
{x € Rn: For any sequence (f*,;y*) in R+ x Y with tk > 0 and tending to (0 , j ) , there exists
another sequence (xk) e Rn tending to x such that (yk + tkxk) e Y for large enough k}
lrThe condition that preferences are such that their tangency paths have a single point of intersection, is discussed in
Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) and is a mild restriction on preferences. From now on we assume preferences to satisfy
this condition, i.e.,
(A5) The tangency paths of any preference have a unique point of intersection.
A more complex condition than being affinely homothetic is given in Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) for preferences
not meeting this single intersection condition. Note that a profile of preferences can be AH without any of them
actually being homothetic, and without any two of them being identical. Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) establishes
that condition (D5) is equivalent to the following statement: "..differences between preferences, and their departures
from homotheticity, can be removed by suitable changes in initial endowments" (p. 51). Note also that (D5) is
equivalent to the fact that when all individual consumption vectors are strictly positive, then aggregate demand is
independent of the distribution of endowments.
(D7) The normal cone toY (zR* at the point y eY, denoted Nc(Y,y), is the set
Nc(Y,y) = {xe R":(x,y) Z OVy <s Tc(Y,y)}
Let (x) = (xl,x2,.xi..xm), and (y) = (
(D8)A marginal cost pricing equilibrium is a triple {(*)>(.y)>p} where the price p is in the unit
simplex in Rn, satisfying
*.= ArgMax Ufa) for all i (utility maximization by consumers).
y.e9\Yj\ where d denotes the set-theoretic boundary, and p is in the normal cone
NC(YP yX toYjOt yj for all j (first order conditions for profit maximization by firms).
^.x t < ]T .y. + (0 (for all commodities demand does not exceed supply).
In words, an mcpe is a price vector and a set of consumption and production plans such that
consumers maximize utility subject to budget constraints defined by the value of their endowments
and their profit income at the equilibrium prices and production levels, and all production plans meet
the first order conditions for profit maximization at the equilibrium prices.
5. Results.
Our main result, the non-existence of robustly efficient mcpe, is in Theorem 2. In Theorem 1 we
give condition on preferences >-,- and endowments of goods and services COi that are necessary and
sufficient to ensure that whatever the technologies Yj at least one mcpe will be efficient. These
conditions on preferences and on endowments of goods and services guarantee an efficient mcpe,
independently of the structure of the production side of the economy and the allocation of its profits
(or losses). They are an essential input in the proof of Theorem 2.
Note that we do not give here conditions sufficient to ensure the existence of a mcpe. Such
conditions are discussed in Beato and Mas-Colell (1985), Brown Heal Khan and Vohra (1986) and
Dierker Guesnerie and Neuefeind (1985), and the reader may verify that the sufficient conditions in
for example Brown Heal Khan and Vohra (1986) are satisfied by our assumptions. We concentrate
here on the efficiency of mcpe.
Theorem 1. Consider an economy as defined in section 2 and satisfying (Al) to (AS). A
necessary and sufficient condition on preferences >-,- for the existence of at least one efficient mcpe
whatever the endowments {wt-}._. and technologies Y} is that the profile of individual
preferences {>-1>-2>"3 >"„} w AH as defined in (D5).
Proof. Sufficiency. Suppose that the preference profile {>*i,>-2»>"3» >>-«} is affinely
homothetic as defined in (D5). Then there exists a family of convex sets G(x) for each x as defined
in (D4) which define a transitive preference. Represent this preference by the continuous utility
function U(x) (a continuous representation may be chosen because the preferred-or-indifferent sets
G(x) are closed, being the sums of closed sets whose asymptotic cones are positively semi-
independent (Debreu, (1959), p 23.)). This function U(x) is defined on X = ^.Xi% the sum of the
individual consumption sets.
Let A = Xr^(Y + 0)), where Y = ^.Yi is the sum of the economy's production sets and
co = ^ . w, is the sum of the individual endowments. A is the set of aggregate attainable states of the
economy. An application of Lemma 3 of Brown and Heal (1982) establishes that by (Al) and (A2) A
is compact Define x* = ArgMaxU(x), which exists by continuity of U(x) and compactness of A.
X£A
We first show that x* represents a Pareto efficient allocation in the initial economy. By
construction of G(x) any allocation which is Pareto superior to x* is in the interior of G(x *). But no
point in the interior of G(x *) is feasible because x* maximizes U(x) over A and hence there can be
no point in the interior of G(x *) that is also in A. Hence x* is Pareto efficient.
It remains to show that there exist prices such that at these prices x* can be disaggregated as an
mcpe. This is an application of Theorem 1 of Khan and Vohra (1987), noting that aggregate demand
is independent of the distribution of endowments.
Necessity. The proof of necessity proceeds via two lemmas. The first, Lemma 1, (stated and
proved in the Appendix) shows that "almost no" preference profiles are AH.
Lemma 2. Let Ex and E2 be exchange economies with total endowment wl and w2 * w1
respectively. They have the same preferences, which are not affinely homothetic (violate (D5)). Let
xl be a Pareto efficient allocation in Ex with supporting prices p\ and let x2 be a Pareto efficient
allocation in E2 with supporting prices p2tpl& p2. Then the set of initial endowments at which xl
is a competitive equilibrium intersects a translate of the set of initial endowments at which x2 is a
competitive equilibrium. Formally:
<t>ffinU{xl) + o(w2 -wl)\*0
where 0 (.) is defined in (D2).
Proof. We have to show that for any y e<j)(x ) there exists y1e^(^1) such that
y =y +dlw - w 1, where Qiw - w l is a distribution over all of the agents of the difference
(w -w1) between the aggregate endowments of the two exchange economies i.e.,
(pix j r i | <p[x J + 6\w - wl)\ * 0 . For this we need some notation.
Define a generalization of the Edge worth box denoted B as:
9 l - : ! ,*, = * * } , k=l,2.
We shall express B, (p(x) and y{x) as solutions of systems of simultaneous linear equations.
To start, note that B can be expressed as Bk = [y e St""1 : y.A = wk e 9t"} where
is an nm by n matrix made up of the nxn identity matrix [ln ] stacked vertically m times.
We can also express ys(x) as the solution of a system of
equations: y/(xk) = {ye R^"1* : y.Ek = v*} where v* e 9t"\ v* = p*.Jcf, vf e 91, xk is a consumption
vector in 9T, p* is a supporting price vector and



























nm x m matrix. It follows immediately from the definitions that (f> (**)= VM-*n
Clearly this intersection is not empty as it contains Jc*. Note that Q(x) can be expressed as the
set of points satisfying both of the above equation systems. Let A and Ek be as defined above and
[A, £*] be the mn by (m+n) matrix whose first n columns are those of A and whose remaining m
columns are those of Ek. Similarly, (w*,v*) is the row vector whose first n components are those of
wk and whose last m components are those of v*. Then <(>(xk) = [y e 9tm'l:;y.[A,£*] = (wk, v*)j.
To see that ^(jc2)n{0(jc1)+d(w2-w1)}?fe0 let / . [ A . ^ J ^ H ^ V 1 ) and
y2.[A,E2] = (w 2 , v 2 j . Then set y2 = yl + A for some A 6 SK*™, which we can always do. Now
( /+A) . [A ,£ 2 ] = (w2 ,v2),and(y + A).A = w2, yl.A = wl, so that A .A = ( H > 2 - V ) . Hence
A = 61w - w J, proving the Lemma. •
To prove necessity, assume that preferences are not afflnely homothetic (i.e., (D5) is violated).
We shall use a modification and extension of the argument of Chichilnisky (1990 Theorem 3.2) which
establishes the existence of an aggregate endowment, a production possibility set and a set of shares
in the outputs of firms such that all mcpe are Pareto inefficient. Chichilnisky's Theorem 3.1 (used in
her proof of Theorem 3.2) does not apply here and is replaced by Lemma 1 of the Appendix.
Given that preferences are not afflnely homothetic, from Lemma 1 of the Appendix and
Chichilnisky (1990 Theorem 3.2) it is routine but lengthy to establish the existence of:
* a technology Y,
* points p and £ in the aggregate attainable set A with the aggregate endowment of the
economy being p and § - p being the net aggregate output,
* distributions of the totals p and § between individuals such that p and £ are the only
productively efficient points and neither is Pareto efficient.
The next step is to prove that the distributions of the total net outputs p and £ between
individuals that ensure that both aggregate points are inefficient, are consistent in that both can arise
within a standard specification of ownership patterns in a general equilibrium model. This is a
consequence of Lemma 2, as follows. We apply Lemma 2 and set p = w1 and £ = w2. Clearly
X1 = (jcj,...*^) is an efficient distribution of the endowment p = w1 arising from a no-production
equilibrium. This distribution gives rise to the community preferred or indifferent set G4(/3).
Similarly x1 = (x2,...x^ is an efficient distribution of the supply vector % = w2 at the mcpe with
production which in turn gives rise to the community preferred or indifferent set G\£) whose
boundary intersects that of G4(p). By construction x2 = (i2,...*2) is in the interior of G4(p) and
therefore Pareto superior to xl = (jtf,... j£). At the same time, xl = (xJ,...i:J,) is in the interior of
G\Z) and therefore Pareto superior to X2 = (jt2,...i2), so that neither allocation can be Pareto
efficient in the production economy.
Lemma 2 shows that there are initial endowments (w*1w*2,...,w*m) from which the
equilibrium consumption vector is x1 = (x},... jcj,) and that when we change this endowment vector
( w * , w V " ' w * J by a n amount 0 *=(01*,&2*,~.*6m*) which sums to the net production vector
w2 — w1 = % — p then we arrive at a set of endowments in the economy with production for which
the production equilibrium is X2 = (i?,....*2). Clearly this change in endowments is equivalent to
giving individual i a fraction 0, * of the profit from operating the technology at the point % = w2.
Hence both equilibria are consistent with a single normally-specified distribution of endowments of
goods and services and of profits (or losses) in the production economy. Note furthermore that all
individuals have non-negative incomes at the production equilibrium, as consumption vectors and
prices are non-negative2. This completes the proof of Theorem l.«
In Theorem 2 we address the issue of the robustness of Pareto efficient mcpe. We assume the
economy to have a finite number of equilibria, each of which depends continuously on preferences
and endowments. Smale (1974, theorem, page 120) establishes that this is a generic property for
exchange economies using the Whitney topology, and in his Main Theorem (page 126) extends this to
2
 Note that at the production equilibrium, some individuals may of course be worse off than at the no production
equilibrium, both because prices are different and because they are shareholders in firms that are making losses at this
equilibrium.
production economies. Genericity in the Whitney topology implies genericity in the C^ sup norm
topology: however, Smale imposes a smoothness condition on production functions which we do not
adopt, so that his results can not be used to justify our assumption.
Theorem 2. In the class of non-convex economies with a finite number of locally unique
equilibria depending continuously on preferences and endowments, there are no robustly efficient
mcpe.
Proof. There are two stages to the proof. Stage 1: we consider any Pareto efficient mcpe,
and demonstrate that arbitrarily small changes in the economy suffice to ensure that this equilibrium is
no longer an efficient mcpe. We repeat this process for all of the finite number of equilibria of the
economy. Stage 2: we show that these changes do not introduce a new efficient mcpe.
The argument in stage 1 is summarized in figures la and lb. Figure la shows an economy with
a Pareto efficient mcpe. Figure lb shows another economy obtained by modifying the preferences
and attainable set of the first very slightly. Preferences have been modified so that in lb there is an
intersection of two community indifference curves corresponding to two different income
distributions at the point in the attainable set A corresponding to the equilibrium in la. The attainable
set has been modified by altering technologies so that its boundary follows the segments abcde in a
neighborhood of the equilibrium in la. That preferences can be so modified by an arbitrarily small
perturbation, follows from the next lemma.
Efficient mcpe Inefficient mcpe
Fig la Fig lb
Figure 1: small perturbations in preferences and the attainable set remove a Pareto efficient mcpe
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Lemma 2. For any CO€RH, the set of preference profiles psPm giving an intransitive
community preference at CO eR*, denoted pj^co), is open and dense in Pmin the C sup norm
topology.
Proof. For the social preference to be transitive at CO e R*, it is necessary that at all sets of
consumption vectors \xxvx\,x\,..^\xlixlixl,.^,\xl,x\,xl,...}, satisfying
(a) ^x'^G) and
(b) for all consumers NJ^xj) = Nj,
we have Nj = N V/. Consider now an allocation and a preference profile that together satisfy
(a) and (b). Alter every preference slightly in a neighborhood of the distribution { JC} ,*^ , . . . } of CO.
Ensure that Vi^N^x]) = iVp but choose N^N. Such a preference profile can be arbitrarily close to
the original but is not transitive at CO. This establishes that the complement of the set of preference
profiles that are transitive at CO is a dense set This complement is open because the set of profiles
transitive at CO is closed, by arguments similar to those used in Lemma 1 in establishing that (a) and
(b) are closed conditions. •
The two attainable sets in figure 1 can be made as close as we wish in the C topology on
functions <z(0) as discussed in section 2.
It remains to be shown that the social indifference curve through b in figure lb corresponds to
the distribution of welfare when b is an equilibrium, and the social indifference curve through d
corresponds to the distribution of welfare when d is an equilibrium. This follows from the arguments
used in the sufficiency part of the proof of Theorem 1 above. This observation completes stage 1 of
the proof of Theorem 2.
Stage 2 of the proof of Theorem 2 uses the assumption that the number of equilibria is finite and
that equilibria vary continuously with preferences and endowments. It follows that small changes in
preferences, as discussed in stage 1, will lead to small changes in equilibria. Hence the modification
of preferences described in stage 1 will not create new equilibria. The only way in which new
efficient equilibria could arise, is if existing inefficient mcpe become Pareto efficient as a result of the
perturbations of preferences described in stage 1. But a mcpe is Pareto inefficient if it is not a
maximal element of the set of attainable utility values under the vector ordering. This is clearly an
open property with respect to changes in preferences in the C sup norm topology. Hence a small
perturbation of preferences cannot result in a previously inefficient mcpe becoming Pareto efficient.
This completes the argument of stage 2 of the proof and hence proves the theorem. •
In Corollary 1 we consider an economy where preferences meet the condition of Theorem 1 so
that there is always at least one Pareto efficient mcpe. We give an additional condition under which
l l
all mcpe are Pareto efficient
Corollary 1. Let consumer preferences be affinely homothetic (as in (D5)) and let the
community preference be represented by the utility function U(x). Assume that the attainable set
A — X Pi (7 4- CO) can be represented by the equation F(x) > 0 and that both F(x) and U(x) are
continuously differentiate. Also let there be an x such that F(x) > 0 . Then a sufficient condition for
all mcpe to be Pareto efficient is that there exists a regular C1 diffeomorphism T from R* to R* such
that the "transformed" programming problem maximize U°T(x) subject to F°T(x)>0 is
concave.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 (i) of Heal (1985) and the arguments in the sufficiency
proof of Theorem 1 above. •
Corollary 1 is isolating a class of optimization problems where in spite of the feasible set being
non-convex, any critical point is a global maximum. Intuitively this means that preferences are "more
curved than" the non-convexities in the feasible set (see figure 2). Economies that are log-linear but
non-convex can satisfy this condition. This property is related to the concept of "generalized
convexity" discussed in the optimization literature (see Heal (1985) for details). Intuitively, there is a
clear explanation for Corollary 1: the structure of critical points of a real-valued function on a manifold
is invariant under diffeomorphisms of the commodity space, so that we are characterizing economies
that in terms of this structure of critical points are like convex economies. However, the economic
interpretation of these conditions is less clear than that of Theorems 1: this is why we have focussed
in Theorem 1 on conditions that can be verified simply and by inspection of preferences alone. (For a
related condition see Quinzii (1988)).
Contours of U(x)
Figure 2: a non-convex economy where all mcpe are Pareto efficient.
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The next Corollary establishes a connection between the efficiency of mcpe in an economy with
production and the uniqueness of competitive equilibrium in an associated exchange economy. It says
that if preferences are such that we can find a set of individual endowments that together with these
preferences form an exchange economy whose competitive equilibrium is non-unique, then we can
also find a technology that together with the preferences forms an economy whose mcpe are
inefficient. Thus the possibility of non-uniqueness of competitive equilibrium implies the possible
inefficiency of all mcpe.
Corollary 2. Let individual preferences >-, be such that for some total endowment vv° there
exists a distribution w?, / = l,....m, of w° amongst individuals with w,°>0 V*\ at which the
exchange economy {(>-,•)* = l,...m,(w?)i = l,...m| has more than one competitive equilibrium. Then
there exists a production economy satisfying (Al) to (A4) having >-. as individual preferences in
which all mcpe are Pareto inefficient.
Proof. Let wf, i = l,....m, be the distribution of the total endowment leading to two different
competitive equilibria of the exchange economy CEl = [x\,...xlmyp]} and CE2 = (jCp.-Jc^,/?2). Then
(*) wf, / = l , . . . . m e ^ ( f ) n ^ ( j c 2 ) where Jc* = (xf,...Jc*) £ = 1,2.
Let Gx(w°) = X-C/^iJ) and G^vv0) = ^ .G^i}) which have supports p1 and p2 respectively
at w°. Pick %edGl(w°) and pedG2(w°) in such a way that £e in tG 2 (w° ) and
P e int Gl(w°). This can be done because of the arguments of Chichilnisky (1990) Theorem 3.2 Step
1. Clearly ft is Pareto superior to £ and £ is Pareto superior to /3 (this is illustrated in Figure 3).
Now we note that the existence of two (or more) competitive equilibria from a single initial
endowment vector implies the intersection of social indifference curves in which case preferences are
not affinely homothetic and Corollary 2 follows from Theorem 1.
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,w
Figure 3: an exchange economy with non-unique competitive equilibria CE1 and CE2 supported by
prices PI andP2. The associated social indifference curves through W, Gl and G2, intersect.
Appendix.
Lemma 1. Let P be the space of preference satisfying (A4), with the topology given by the
Cl sup norm 1/^ = sup| | /(^),/yU)|. Then the set of preference profiles in Pm that are AH has a
complement that is open and dense.
Proof. First we show that being affinely homothetic (AH) is a closed property in the C1
topology. Hence the complement of the set of AH profiles is open. Consider a set of vectors
Z^Zs...—* Z* eR*. Let Uv U2, C/3,... be a sequence of preferences generated by shifting the origin
of a fixed homothetic preference by the vectors ZlZ2Z3..., i.e., U£x) = U(x + Zt) where U is a
homothetic preference. Clearly every element of this sequence of preferences is AH and the limit is
also an AH preference.
A homothetic preference satisfying (A4) can be represented by a C2 function from Sn~l, the (n-
1) dimensional sphere in Rn, to Sn~\ /.: 5"1"1 -»S""1. This is because on each ray in the commodity
space the preference has a single normal vector. Such a function defines a normal of unit norm to the
tangent to the indifference surface along each ray in the commodity space. This is unique on a given
ray by homotheticity. Both the space of normals of unit norm and the space of rays are equivalent to
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Sn l. An affine translation of a homothetic preference can be represented by such a functions plus a
point Z;, the vector by which the origin of a homothetic preference is translated. Let fvf2,fv be
a sequence of such functions having / * as a limit. Because the space of smooth functions between
manifolds is a complete space in the C1 topology, / * is also an affine translation of a homothetic
preference3. Hence the space of AH profiles is closed under limits of origin shifts and also under
limits of homothetic preferences, and is therefore closed. Hence the complement of the set of AH
profiles is open.
Next we have to show that the complement of the set of AH profiles is dense. We show this by
demonstrating that an arbitrarily small deformation of any AH profile takes it out of the space of AH
profiles. Take the first preference in an AH profile and pick a point x in 9t". Modify this preference
only in a small neighborhood of x , continuing to respect the assumptions (A4). Then the modified
preference is no longer a homothetic preference with its origin translated, because there is a ray in the
commodity space on which the normal to the indifference curves is not constant The result is a profile
that is not AH, but can be made arbitrarily close to the initial AH profile. This establishes that the
complement of the set of AH profiles is dense, and completes the proof of Lemma 1. •
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